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We consider models of financial markets in which all parties involved find incentives to participate.
Strategies are evaluated directly by their virtual wealths. By tuning the price sensitivity and market
impact, a phase diagram with several attractor behaviors resembling those of real markets emerge,
reflecting the roles played by the arbitrageurs and trendsetters, and including a phase with irregular
price trends and positive sums. The positive-sumness of the players’ wealths provides participation
incentives for them. Evolution and the bid-ask spread provide mechanisms for the gain in wealth
of both the players and market-makers. New players survive in the market if the evolutionary rate
is sufficiently slow. We test the applicability of the model on real Hang Seng Index data over 20
years. Comparisons with other models show that our model has a superior average performance
when applied to real financial data.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.40.-a, 89.65.Gh
I. INTRODUCTION
The potentials of using agent-based models to analyze
and elucidate the behavior of financial markets are gradu-
ally realized in the physics community in recent years [1].
These models are able to relate the attributes of the ind-
vidual players, such as their memory sizes and payoffs, to
the collective behavior of the system, such as the informa-
tion content, volatility, and phase transitions [2, 3, 4, 5].
The key insight of a family of these models, known as
the Minority Games, is the observation that the players
making the minority decisions take advantages of their
counterparts during trading, and the adaptive behavior
towards this target results in the non-trivial behavior of
the financial markets.
However, the original Minority Game does not provide
a correct perspective to model financial markets, in which
players participate only when they see chances of getting
profits. Since the winners in the games belong to the
minority group at each time step, they become negative-
sum games. Consequently, were the players given the
option to withdraw from the market, their participation
cannot sustain.
Variations of the original version of the game provided
partial solutions to the issue. For example, the influence
of wealth in the decisions of the agents was considered
[6, 7, 8]. In these models, the buying power of an agent
is curtailed when she does not have enough wealth. This
creates a natural mechanism to expel the poor agents
from the market, although the issue of participation in-
centives was not the focus of those studies.
Another mechanism for the agents to change their sta-
tus of participation was considered in the so-called grand-
canonical Minority Game [6, 7, 8, 9]. The speculators
have the option to participate or withdraw from the mar-
ket according to their perception of profitability. How-
ever, the wealth gained by the so-called producers, whose
predictable strategies made them the prey of arbitrage by
the speculators, is at best zero. Thus, the issue merely
shifts from the speculators to the producers: were the
producers given the option to withdraw from the mar-
ket, their participation cannot sustain.
The $-game considered whether the market makers can
be prevented from being arbitraged by the players [5]. It
was found that the market-makers are able to arbitrage
the players when the strategies of the players are too com-
plex, but they are arbitraged by the players otherwise.
The issue of voluntary participation remains: either the
market-makers or the players are tempted to withdraw
from the game, were they given the option.
The agent-based models are remote from realistic fi-
nancial markets in another aspect. More often, agents
in real markets evaluate their strategies in real financial
terms, namely, how much wealth the strategies would
have brought them in the market history, had the play-
ers adopted them. In contrast, players in the agent-based
models use various ways to update the virtual points or
scores of their strategies when they make transactions.
Typical virtual point updating rules, such as those in
the original Minority Game [2], evaluate the buying and
selling decisions at a time step, regardless of the need
to update the historical effects of the previous decisions.
In other models, one-step expectations of the players are
considered, leading to the $-Game [5], and markets with
a mixture of majority and minority game players [10].
However, these models of myopic players may not reflect
the history-dependent considerations of real market play-
ers.
An example is the evaluation of holding a position (that
is, a decision of taking no buying or selling actions). In
real markets, players need the option to hold a position,
either by actively including it as a decision prescribed
by their strategies, or by passively refraining from buy-
ing and selling decisions, consequential to their reaching
maximum or minimum positions respectively. Virtual
point updates in most agent-based models are neutral to
holding positions.
To incorporate the option of holding a position, the
2most common method used in the grand-canonical mod-
els is to monitor whether the virtual points passively fall
below a certain threshold [4, 9]. Now if holding a position
is part of a player’s option, the benefits of taking such
a position should be reflected in the payoff functions, so
that the players can choose to hold long (short) positions
when prices are rising (falling). These considerations are
best reflected in monitoring the wealth associated with
the strategy decisions. We therefore focus on wealth-
based strategies in this paper. Wealth-based strategies
were previously considered in exogenous markets [11]. As
will be shown, agents with wealth-based strategies in en-
dogenous markets can self-organize to exhibit even more
interesting coordinated behaviors.
In this paper, we consider models of financial markets
in which all parties involved find incentives to partici-
pate. Our models incorporate several realistic features
recently added to the Minority Game, including wealth-
based strategies and the opening and closing of an agent’s
position during trading [11, 12], but the focus will be
the issue of participation incentives, attractor behavior,
and tests with real data. As will be shown, the players
are able to arbitrage the market-makers in the absence
of the spread in the bid and ask prices, provided that
the market impact or the price sensitivity to the excess
demand are sufficiently low. On the other hand, in an
evolving market, underperforming players leave the mar-
ket and new players bring their wealth into the market,
rendering it a positive-sum game. The market-makers
share the wealth by imposing spreads in the bid and ask
prices. To complete the picture, we find that it is possi-
ble for the new players to have incentives to participate,
if the evolutionary rate is sufficiently slow. Compared
with previous models, our models are relatively simple in
terms of the number of parameters, and may be eventu-
ally amenable to analytical approaches similar to those
which have proved successful in the study of the Minority
Game [13, 14, 15].
The paper is organized as follows. After introducing
the model in Section II, we describe in Section III the dif-
ferent attractor behaviors resembling those in real mar-
kets and map the positive-sumness of the players in the
absence evolution and the bid-ask spread. In Section
IV we consider the effects of the bid-ask spread imposed
by the market-makers. In Section V, we complete the
picture by considering the conditions under which the
new players in an evolving market are able to enhance
their survival. In Section VI, we test the applicability
of wealth-based strategies on real Hang Seng index data,
followed by a conclusion in Section VII.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a model of the financial market in which
N agents trade. Although we are interested in finan-
cial markets in general (stocks, foreign exchange etc.),
we will use the language of stock markets for the sake of
convenience. At each time step the agents make trading
decisions +1,−1 or 0, which represent buying or selling
a unit of stock, or taking a holding position respectively.
Denoting the decision of agent i at time t by ai(t), the
position ki(t) of agent i at time t is given by
ki(t) =
∑
t′≤t
ai(t
′). (1)
Positive and negative ki(t) refer to a long and short po-
sition respectively.
Introducing the positions of the agents provides a sim-
ple way to model the effects of the limited weatlh of the
agents in real markets. In previous models, the amount of
stocks bought (sold) by an agent following each decision
is a fraction of her capital (stock) [6, 7]. Here, to decor-
porate the limitations of wealth in the presence of both
long and short positions, we define a maximum position
K by imposing the constraint, i.e. |ki(t)| ≤ K. Once the
maximum position is reached, decisions which further in-
crease the magnitude of the positions are ignored. A con-
sequence of this model of trading behavior is that wealth
accumulation is additive, in contrast to other models in
which wealth accumulation is multiplicative [6, 7].
The stock price should evolve according to their de-
mand and supply. Thus, the price of one unit of stock is
updated by
P (t+ 1) = P (t) + sign[A(t)]|A(t)|γ (2)
where A(t) ≡
∑
i ai(t) represent the excess demand.
When there are more (less) buyers than sellers, A(t) is
positive (negative) driving the price up (down) according
to Eq. (2). The exponent γ describes the sensitivity of
price increment to the excess demand, γ = 0 and 1 for the
cases of step [2, 3, 4] and linear functions [9] respectively,
which was extensively studied in the literature. On the
other hand, there is evidence for γ ≈ 0.5 [16].
In market clearing processes, there is usually a dis-
crepancy between the price expected by an agent when
she submitted her bid and the actual transaction price
[11]. This discrepancy arises from the sequential process
of clearing the deals at each time step, during which the
transaction price changes from its present value to the
new value according to Eq. (2). For simplicity, we assume
that the transacion price is the same for all transactions
at time t. Thus, we approximate the transaction price
PT as
PT(t) = (1 − β)P (t) + βP (t+ 1) (3)
with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. The variable β acts as a market im-
pact factor, since it arises from the collective effects of
agent participation, and reduces the profit of the major-
ity of the participating agents relative to the so-called
price takers. When β = 1, agents experience full mar-
ket impact in transactions and are trading with the next
price. When β = 0, agents experience no market impact
in transactions and are trading with the immediate price.
3With this evolving transaction price, we let wi(t) be
the wealth of agent i at time t just after the decision
ai(t) is carried out and the transaction is completed. The
wealth wi(t) is the sum of cash ci(t) and stock values in
hand, namely,
wi(t) = ci(t) + ki(t)PT(t), (4)
with ki(t) given by Eq. (1). The second term of Eq. (4)
corresponds to the stock values in hand, which is the
product of the position held and the current transaction
price. PT(t) instead of P (t) is employed in calculating
wealth, since it represents the actual stock value once
decisions are implemented. Cash is updated according
to the buying and selling of stocks at time t, namely,
ci(t) = ci(t− 1)− ai(t)PT(t). (5)
Suppose agent i buys (sells) a unit of stock at time t. Her
cash is lowered (raised) by an amount PT(t) while her
value of stocks in hand is increased by the same amount,
so that any change in wealth is due to the change in
value of the stocks she previously held. After rearranging
Eqs.(2)-(4), the wealth change of agent i after transac-
tions at time t can be expressed as
wi(t)− wi(t− 1) = ki(t− 1)[PT(t)− PT(t− 1)]. (6)
Next, we consider the strategies used by the agents to
reach their decisions in the evolving market environment.
In this paper we will consider endogenous environments.
In this case, the market environmment at time t is de-
scribed by µ(t), which is one of the 2m strings of the m
most recent outcomes of the sign of price changes. Thus,
m is called the memory size.
A strategy prescribes the decisions +1, 0,−1 in re-
sponse to each of the 2m states of the market environ-
ment. Each agent draws s strategies randomly at the
beginning of the game. Every strategy should have at
least one buying and selling decisions. At every time step,
each agent selects the most successful strategy among the
s strategies she owns and uses it to make a decision. The
success of a strategy is measured by the virtual wealth
it should have acquired were its decisions followed in the
market history. This means that for strategy σ, we start
with the initial virtual wealth wσ(0) = 0 and update their
values in the same way as we do for real wealth, that is,
kσ(t) = max{−K,min[K, kσ(t− 1) + aσ(t)]}, (7)
wσ(t) = wσ(t− 1) + kσ(t− 1)[PT − PT(t− 1)], (8)
where PT is the transaction price determined from the
real transactions in Eq. (3). In this way, the virtual
wealths of the strategies are calculated as if they were
the price takers.
A common way to model the incentives of the agents to
participate in the market or otherwise is to allow one of
their s strategies to be a 0-strategy, such as that adopted
in the grand-canonical Minority Game [6, 7, 8, 9]. The
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FIG. 1: The phase diagram showing the phases of the
trendsetters’ attractor, the arbitageurs’ attractor, the mix-
ture phase, and the irregular phase for m = 3, s = 2, K = 3,
N = 1000, 106 steps and 100 samples. Thick solid (dashed)
line: transition discontinuous (continuous) in predictability
and volatility. Thin solid (dashed) line: contours of the prob-
ability of the trendsetters’ (arbitrageurs’) attractor.
0-strategy refers to one with a holding decision irrespec-
tive of the market environment. Indeed, this feature can
be incorporated into our model. However, as we shall
see, the basic behavior remains the same. Hence, unless
mentioned explicitly, the 0-strategy will not be included
in our model.
Unlike the original Minority Game [2], an agent in this
model can hold a long or short position while at the same
time the virtual positions of the adopted strategy are
updated independently. The use of virtual wealths in
evaluating strategies is an essential difference with the
conventional models of the Minority Game, which will
be discussed in detail in Section VI. The ways of wealth
accounting in the current market model and the Minority
Game are summarized in Table I in Section VI. In the
present model, the increment of real wealth as well as the
virtual wealths of strategies at each step depends on the
historical sum of actions according to Eqs.(1), (6), and
Eqs.(7), (8) respectively, which implicitly embed a longer
memory scale in wealth monitoring and strategy selection
than the original Minority Game. This long memory in
wealh monitoring introduces a great complexity in the
dynamics of system, which brings in a rich behavior re-
flecting aspects of real markets.
4FIG. 2: (Color online) The time dependence of price for 3 samples with m = 3, s = 2, K = 1, N = 1000 for (a) the arbitrageurs’
phase at (γ, β) = (0.8, 0.4), (b) the trendsetters’ phase at (γ, β) = (0.2, 0.8), (c) the irregular phase at (γ, β) = (0.8, 0.8), and
(d) the phase boundary at (γ, β) = (0.8, 0.5).
III. THE PHASE DIAGRAM
In the phase space of price sensitivity γ and market
impact β, we found the phases shown in Fig. 1. Examples
of the time series of price and the corresponding average
wealth are shown respectively in Figs. 2 and 3. It can
be seen that the system behaves very differently in the
arbitrageurs’, the trendsetters’ and the irregular phases.
We will discuss these behaviors in detail in the following
subsections.
A. The Arbitrageurs’ Attractor
In the region with β ≤ 0.5 and sufficiently large γ,
the system eventually falls into periodic attractors with
agents buying and selling according to the self-generated
price change in a recursive manner. In most cases, the
system gets attracted to a period-two cycle in which the
same groups of agents synchronize into buying and selling
at consective time steps, which drives the price oscillating
between a higher and lower value accordingly, as shown
in Fig. 2(a). Suppose the prices in the period-2 cycle are
P0 and P0 + |A0|
γ . Then the transaction prices become
P0+ β|A0|
γ and P0+(1− β)|A0|
γ . With β < 0.5, agents
engaged in this cycle gain (1−2β)|A0|
γ per cycle by buy-
ing at a lower price and selling immediately at a higher
price. These agents can be called the arbitrageurs. The
attractor is robust since the net gain in wealth of the
arbitrageurs reinforces their use of the so-called smart
strategies when the market dynamics is dominated by the
buy-sell cycles [17]. The anti-arbitrageurs, who sell at a
lower price and buy immediately at a higher price, lose
(1−2β)|A0|
γ per cycle. Since the virtual wealths of their
strategies are much lower, they are outnumbered by the
arbitrageurs. Other agents adopt strategies which have
an unequal number of buy and sell decisions in a period-2
cycle, and their maximum or minimum positions prevent
them from participating in the market.
The behaviors of the arbitrageurs are reminiscent of
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The time dependence of the average wealth for the corresponding samples in Fig. 2.
those of the privileged traders in real financial markets.
They place their buying (selling) bids in the market,
stimulating price rises (drops). The regime of low market
impact corresponds to the dominance of these traders,
who have the privilege to have their bids cleared earlier
than the other traders, and hence enjoy a more favorable
price before the price moves significantly. At the next
step, they place an opposite bid in the market, stimulat-
ing a price change in the reverse direction, and recovering
their cash (stocks) with a profit margin.
As shown in Fig. 3(a), the average wealth of the agents
increases linearly with time. When β = 0.5, the agents
buy and sell at the same price in the cycle, resulting in
zero change their average wealth after the transients have
subsided, as shown in Fig. 3(d).
A phase transition takes place at β = 0.5, since in the
regime of large market impact with β > 0.5, agents en-
gaged in similar buy and sell cycles are eventually losing
as they are buying at a higher price and selling at a lower
price. As shown in Fig. 4(a), the average wealth gain of
the agents changes from positive to negative at β = 0.5
for γ = 0.5 and K = 1. The change is accompanied by a
change in the slope, indicating that a continuous phase
transition is taking place, and can be attributed to the
disappearance of the arbitrageurs’ attractor at β = 0.5.
Furthermore, we monitor the predictability H [18] and
the volatility σ [3]. The former is defined as
H =
∑
µ
ρ(µ)〈δP |µ〉2 (9)
where 〈δP |µ〉 is the average of the price change condi-
tional on state µ, and ρ(µ) is the probability of occurrence
of state µ. The volatility σ of price changes is defined as
σ =
√
〈δP 2〉 − 〈δP 〉2. (10)
Since the dynamics of the arbitrageurs’ attractor is em-
bedded in a low dimensional space, we expect that the
excess demand A scales as N in this regime [19, 20]. Con-
sequently, we expect that H and σ scales as N2γ and Nγ
respectively. As shown in Figs. 4(b)-(c), the predictabil-
ity vanishes and the volatility is greatly reduced for β
above 0.5, supporting the pictures of a phase transition.
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FIG. 4: The dependence on β of (a) the average wealth gain per step, (b) the predictability, and (c) the volatility, for γ = 0.5
and K = 1. Simulations are performed with N = 100, 300, 1000, 105 steps, and 1000 samples.
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FIG. 5: An example of the trendsetters’ attractor showing
(a) the price (b) the position of a typical trendsetter, and (c)
the wealth of a typical trendsetter. The first to fourth stages
start at points A, B, C, D respectively. Parameters arem = 3,
s = 2, K = 3, γ = 0.3, β = 0.8 and N = 1000.
B. The Trendsetters’ Attractor
1. Dynamics
The phase space is dominated by the trendsetters’ at-
tractor for sufficiently low γ. It is quasiperiodic, an ex-
ample being shown in Fig. 5. A trendsetter strategy of
memory size m consists of a buying decision responding
to a signal withm consecutive instants of rising price, and
a selling decision responding to a signal with m consecu-
tive instants of dropping price. The trendsetters’ attrac-
tor phase is increasingly prominent when the maximum
position K increases. For a large K, the agents are al-
lowed to hold multiple short or long positions in hand.
This increased freedom allows them to gain by holding a
long (short) position when the price is rising (dropping).
As shown in Fig. 5(a), this strategy enables one to gain at
all time steps in a market dominated by the trendsetters’
attractor, except near the points where a rising trend
switches to a dropping one, or vice versa. Consequently,
the trendsetter strategy is the most successful strategy in
a trendsetters’ attractor, and the agents holding at least
one trendsetter strategy will make decisions accordingly.
These agents are referred to as the trendsetters.
The dynamics of the attractor consists of four stages:
(1) In the first stage, the trendsetters make buying de-
cisions collectively. Starting from short positions, they
accumulate stocks step by step and switch from mini-
mum to maximum positions in 2K steps. At the end
of this stage, the positions of the trendsetters reach the
maximum, and they are restrained from further buying
actions.
(2) In the second stage, another group of agents takes
up the role of collective buying and pushes the price fur-
ther up. This group consists of the fickle agents, who
fickle their decisions between two strategies. Through
the adaptive process of trading, the virtual wealths of the
two strategies adjust to such levels that the selling deci-
sions of a strategy are favoured in the first stage, and the
buying decisions of another strategy are adopted in the
second stage. This causes the fickle agents to take buying
actions in the second stage, pushing the price further up.
At the end of this stage, the positions of the fickle agents
reach the maximum, and they are restrained from further
buying actions. The market will then remain quiet with
no price movement, waiting for a random signal to drive
the next stage.
(3) The third stage is triggered by a randomly gener-
ated selling signal, and the trendsetters respond by collec-
tive selling decisions. Starting from long positions, they
cash in stocks step by step and switch from maximum to
minimum positions in 2K steps. At the end of this stage,
the positions of the trendsetters reach the minimum, and
they are restrained from further selling actions.
(4) In the fourth stage, the fickle agents switch their
strategies to selling, since the falling price in the third
stage reduces the virtual wealth of the buying strategies
and boosts that of the selling strategies. At the end of
this stage, the positions of the fickle agents reach the
minimum, and they are restrained from further selling
actions. The market will then remain quiet with no price
7movement, waiting for a random signal to drive another
cycle.
2. Stability
The stability of the attractor depends on whether the
trendsetters are able to increase their wealth in a cycle.
Consider the case of m = 2, for example. The fast trend-
setters respond to the signals of drop-rise and rise-drop
with buying and selling decisions respectively. They de-
tect the change in the trend at the earliest possible in-
stant and become the first group of trendsetters to benefit
in the first and third stages.
On the other hand, the slowest trendsetters respond
to the signals of drop-rise and rise-drop with selling and
buying decisions respectively. They only join the other
trendsetters m−1 steps after the onset of a trend. Hence
they lose wealth due to their failure to respond timely to
the changing trend in the first and third stages.
However, since the fickle agents push the price further
up and down in the second and fourth stages respectively,
the slowest trendsetters have the opportunity to regain
their wealth through holding long and short positions re-
spectively. So in other words, if the price change caused
by the fickle agents is sufficient to ensure the slowest
trendsetters to gain wealth in a cycle, the trendsetters’
attractor will become stable.
The stability is achievable when the price sensitivity
γ is sufficiently low. Low values of γ imply that the
return in a step is rather insensitive to the excess de-
mand. Since the virtual wealth of the strategies held by
the fickle agents is lower than that of the trendsetters,
the population size of the fickle agents is less than that
of the trendsetters. Hence if the return is insensitive to
the excess demand, the price change caused by the fickle
agents in the second and fourth stages will not be too
much less than those caused by the trendsetters in the
first and third stages. The slowest trendsetters will then
be able to regain their wealth. Consequently, the trend-
setters attractor is only stable for sufficiently low values
of γ.
While the analysis for the general case is not available
so far, we have considered the simple case of m = 2
which capture the essentials of the agent dynamics. In
this case, the number of kinds of agents is few enough for
a systematic analysis. By carefully tracing the decisions
of the different types of agents in this essential model, one
can deduce the price change and the wealth gained by the
different types of agents in the attractor, and hence the
stability condition of the trendsettes’ attractor. Since
the analysis is lengthy, details will not be presented here.
Nevertheless, we mention that the resultant condition, in
the form β ≤ βtrendsetter(γ), has a remarkable agreement
with the simulation results.
It is interesting to consider the stability of the trendset-
ter attractor in the grand-canonical version of our model
market, since it depends on the fickel agents who con-
tinue to lose wealth to the trendsetters. Consider the
grand-canonical market in which each agent has an ex-
tra 0-strategy, which receives a payoff of ǫ at every time
step and whose decisions are 0 irrespective of the envi-
ronment; ǫ is the interest rate. This allows the agents
to refrain from playing, if their other strategies do not
grant them a positive return. Since the fickle agents in
the trendsetter attractor lose wealth, one might expect
that they will withdraws from the market, destabilizing
the attractor.
Surprisingly, we find that the trendsetter attractor con-
tinues to exist in the grand-canonical market. We mon-
itor the strategies of the fickle agents, and find that
their strategies are in fact winning strategies averaged
over time. Hence, the fickle agents do not use the 0-
strategy. However, they switch between the good strate-
gies in an untimely manner, causing them to lose wealth
even though their strategies are gainning when averaged
over time.
Furthermore, we note that the market behavior is
rather sensitive to the interest rate in the original version
of the Minority Game. For example, the predictability
drops significantly when the interest rate changes from
0 to a small positive value [21]. In our model, the mar-
ket behavior in the grand-canonical setting is effectively
the same as that in the canonical one when the inter-
est rate is around 0, as indicated by the wealth gain per
step, predictability and volatility. Even at an interest
rate as high as 0.1, the trendsetter attractors continue to
exist, although the wealth gain per step, predictability
and volatility of the market are gradually reduced in the
negative-sum regime. The insensitivity to the interest
rate in our model is probably due to the use of wealth-
based payoff schemes, and the trendsetters’ phase is in
the regime of positive sum.
3. Dependence on γ
Figure 6 shows the average wealth gain per step, the
predictability, and the volatility when γ increases across
the phase boundary separating the phases of the trend-
setters’ and irregular attractors. There appears a change
in the slope of the wealth gain per step in Fig. 6(a)
when the phase boundary is crossed, but no discontinu-
ities seem to appear in the predictability and volatility
in Figs. 6(b) and (c). This indicates that the phase tran-
sition of the trendsetters’ attractor is milder than that of
the arbitrageurs’ attractors.
Another interesting feature of the trendsetters’ attrac-
tor is that the price does not return to the same value
after one period. This contributes to a constant growth
or decay rate after averaging over many periods. We
have also studied the sample-averaged growth rate of the
price, and found that it also scales as Nγ . After rescaling
by Nγ , the dependence of the growth rate of the price is
qualitatively similar to those in Fig. 6(a)-(c).
In the region where both the trendsetters’ and the arbi-
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FIG. 6: The dependence on γ of (a) the average wealth gain per step, (b) the predictability, and (c) the volatility, for β = 0.8
and K = 3. Simulations are performed with N = 100, 300, 1000, 106 steps, and 100 samples.
trageurs’ attractors are stable, we have a mixture phase.
The type of attractor reached in the steady state depends
on the sample. In this mixture phase, some trendsetters’
attractors are quasistable in the transients, and eventu-
ally settle as arbitrageurs’ attractors in the steady state.
4. Relation to other models
The behavior of the trendsetters’ attractor is very sim-
ilar to the bubbles and crashes found in [6]. There,
the trendsetters first create a rising trend, which sub-
sequently flattens because of their limited buying power.
Then, the so-called fundamentalists act contrarily to the
main trend, triggering the crash. It is impiring to note
the universality of behavior in these two models, despite
the different ways of introducing the relevant parame-
ters. In our model, the trendsetters’ attractor exist only
when the price sensitivity γ is sufficiently low, so that the
trendsetters and their followers are able to gain wealth
at the end of the rising (dropping) trend by having long
(short) positions. On the other hand, the crashes and
bubbles in [6] are sustainable only when the fraction of
investment per agent per step is sufficiently small. We
note that both the price sensitivity in our model and the
investment fraction in [6] play the role of transducing the
excess demand to price movement.
Moreover, both models contain mechanisms for trend
reversal. In [6], trend reversals are triggered by the fun-
damentalists, whereas in our model trend reversals at
the end of rising or dropping trends become unavoidable
since the positions of the agents have reached their max-
imum or minimum.
On the other hand, our model differs from that of [6] in
having fewer parameters, having the market-makers, and
having no reference return. The robustness of the trend-
setters’ attractor despite these differences shows that it is
ubiquitous phenomenon in certain parameter ranges. As
a further step, we have described the role played by the
different types of agents in the self-organization of these
attractors.
The behaviors of the agents in the trendsetters’ attrac-
tor resemble those in real financial markets. The trend-
setters respond to a bullish signal and take buying actions
collectively, creating a bullish market. They stop buying
due to their finite capital or assessment of risks, followed
by the fickle agents who try to catch up. Eventually the
market becomes quiet when all agents have exhausted
their capital or tolerance to risks. Then a bearish signal
appears and the trendsetters sell their stocks, followed
by the fickle agents.
C. The irregular phase
In the phase diagram of Fig. 1, there is an irregular
phase in which the periodic and quasiperiodic attractors
cannot persist. The trendsetters’ attractor appears only
intermittently, since they are not stable in the long run.
Other intermittent states are observed. Abrupt and sud-
den changes are found connecting the intermittent states.
For γ < 1, long term price fluctuations embody fluc-
tuations in shorter time scales. An example is shown in
Fig. 7(a). The trendsetters’ attractors appear in some
transient and intermittent states, especially in the early
stage, but not persistently. The bottom inset shows the
time interval in which the system does not lie in the
trendsetters’ or the arbitrageurs’ attractors, showing the
fluctuations in short time scales embodied in longer time
scale fluctuations.
The case of γ = 1 is special. Since the price change
is linearly related to the global sum of actions A(t), the
price trend in the long run is flat, consequential to the
limit limt′→inf
∑t
t′ A(t
′) ≈ 0 for finite maximum posi-
tions. Thus, the condition γ < 1 is essential in repro-
ducing the non-stationary price trend commonly found
in real financial markets.
The inset of Fig. 7(a) shows the corresponding distri-
bution of price change, with the fat tail of the distribu-
tion obeying a power law. For the leftmost curve, the
exponent is approximately -7.4, resembling the fat tail
volatility distribution in real financial markets [22]. The
sharp drop at the end of the tail is due to finite size
limitations in simulations. The other curve in the same
figure shows that increasing γ causes the distribution of
fluctuations to spread out, and the fat tail decays more
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FIG. 7: (a) An example of the time dependence of the price
at β = 0.8, m = 3, s = 2,γ = 0.7, K = 1 and N = 1000.
Inset: The volatility distribution of price with N = 1000,
β = 0.8 and m = 3, (K, γ) = (1, 0.3) (dash-dotted line), and
(K, γ) = (3, 0.7) (dotted line). Solid line: N = 10000, m = 6,
s = 2, γ = 0.5 and K = 3. (b) Another example of the time
dependence of price at K = 3, other parameters the same as
in (a).
gently.
Fig. 7(b) shows another example of the time series
of price in the irregular phase with K = 3. As shown
in the top inset of Fig. 7(b), the system switches from
one quasi-periodic cycle to another, with an intermedi-
ate state in between. The trendsetters’ attractors appear
in the transients, but not persistently. The bottom inset
of Fig. 7(b) shows that fluctuations are present in mul-
tiple time scales. The price volatility distribution in this
region confirms a fat tail distribution obeying a power
law of exponent −3.8, as shown by the solid line in the
inset of Fig. 7(a).
D. Positive- and negative-sumness
The average wealth of the agents in the space of γ and
β is shown in Fig. 8. For K = 3,the region of positive
average wealth dominates the space. This means that
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FIG. 8: The average wealth gain per step of the agents after
equilibration as a function of γ and β for m = 3, s = 2,
K = 3, N = 1000, 106 steps with 400 samples. Each coutour
represents an increment of 2. The shaded region corresponds
to the region of negative average wealth. The direction of
arrow indicates the the direction of increasing wealth gain.
the market is a positive-sum game for the agents. Much
of the positive-sum region is covered by the region of the
two attractors, as can be seen from a comparison with
Fig. 1. Besides that, there exist regions of positive-sums
in the irregular phase. The behavior of this region re-
sembles the real financial market: agents have a positive
gain on average, while the dynamics is not periodic. Fur-
thermore, the volatility distribution of the price follows
a fat tail distribution with a power law exponent −4 in
the case of K = 3, not very far from those observed in
real financial markets.
This positive-sumness adds a new perspective to con-
ventional market models, such as the original Minority
Game, which has a negative sum in terms of the number
of winners. We remark that the positive-sumness is a
natural consequence of the model where artificial means,
such as capital injection, are not employed to ensure prof-
itability. In real markets, this is essential to resolving the
issue of attracting agents to participate, were they given
the option.
As shown in Fig. 8, the average wealth decreases when
β increases, since the market impact reduces the profit
of the transactions. Furthermore, the effect of the mar-
ket impact on price movements is hardly felt if the price
sensitivity γ is not sufficiently high. Hence the region of
negative-sumness is only found at high values of both β
and γ. This feature also depends on the maximum po-
sition K. In general, the region of negative sum shrinks
with K, as shown in Fig. 9.
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FIG. 9: The regions of positive and negative-sumness in the
space of γ and β for m = 3, s = 2. Simulations are performed
with N = 1000, 105 steps with 400 samples.
E. The role of the market-makers
To understand the origin of the positive-sumness, we
note that supply and demand in the market is not bal-
anced. When there are more buyers than sellers, we im-
plicitly assume someone is willing to provide the extra
stocks for the buyers. Likewise, when there are more sell-
ers than buyers, we implicitly assume someone is willing
to absorb the extra stocks from the sellers. This role
of clearing the extra supply and demand at every time
step is played by the market-makers. At every time step,
the market-makers take actions in opposite to the col-
lective actions of the agents. It results in an exactly
zero-sum game if we sum up the wealth increment of all
the agents and the market-makers. Although the over-
all wealth is zero, the phase diagram in Fig. 1 actually
shows the wealth shifted from the market-maker to the
players, which contribute to the positive-sumness of the
players. It serves as a main allure for individual play-
ers to participate in the market. However, the positive-
sumness of the players implies the negative-sumness of
the market-makers, and the issue of voluntary participa-
tion shifts to why the market-makers have incentives to
participate in the market. Hence, there should be addi-
tional mechanisms bringing positive gain to both players
and the market-makers. Before we address this issue in
the next section, we consider the case of markets without
the market-makers.
F. Markets without market-makers
To model markets without market-makers, we balance
the supply and demand at every time step by randomly
drawing agents from the majority side to match the mi-
nority side, whereas the excess demand before matching
is still used in the determination of price change. Those
who are not fortunate enough to carry out their decisions
are forced to reset their actions to zero for the time be-
ing. As a result, the number of actual buyers and sellers
will be equal at every step. Among the agents, the to-
tal number of long positions is always equal to the total
number of short positions, leading to a zero-sum game
among the agents.
The price trend in this model is very monotonic. This
can be attributed to the extra buyers (sellers) whose
decisions are rejected by the market. While their de-
cisions are frustrated, their bids nevertheless drive the
price up (down), leading to a signal of rising (dropping)
price at the next step. With their frustrated decisions,
they repeat their decisions and buy (sell) again. The sig-
nal of rising (dropping) price continues, and eventually
all agents making the opposite decision are exhausted.
Driven by this extra demand or supply, the price goes
either up or down continuously, but there are no transac-
tions. This behavior resembles the “stubborn majority”
in the $-game [5] except that there are no market-makers
to be arbitraged in the present case. The scenario is fa-
miliar in the real estates market of Tokyo in the early
nineties or Hong Kong in the late nineties, in which real
estates prices are driven by wild speculations to an un-
affordable level. Alternatively, a continuously dropping
market with no transactions is similar to the real estates
market after the burst of the bubble.
While our model is successful in reproducing these re-
alistic features, it has not included mechanisms that ter-
minate the indefinitely rising or dropping trends. This
constitutes a separate issue beyond the scope of this pa-
per.
IV. THE PROFIT OF THE MARKET-MAKERS
In the real market, the market-makers should have a
positive gain in return for balancing the supply and de-
mand. This positive gain encourages them to maintain
their service in the market. It was proposed that the
market-makers may lower the risk of being arbitraged
by the players through adding their inventory to the
excess demand in the determination of price [5]. How-
ever, we found that this method cannot generate profit
for the market-maker in the present model. Hence, we
consider the alternative proposal that the market-makers
impose a bid-ask spread during their transactions with
the players. That is, the transaction prices at time t are
PT(t)±S(t) for the buying and selling agents respectively,
where 2S(t) is the bid-ask spread at time t. Obviously,
imposing the spread makes it possible for the market-
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maker to gain profit from the transactions. However, to
ensure that both the agents and the market-makers have
incentives to participate, the bid-ask spread must be de-
termined in such a way that the wealth of both the agents
and the market-makers are stable in time. Here, we con-
sider three ways of determining the spread and compare
their effectiveness with respect to this objective.
1) Fixed bid-ask spread - Figure 10(a) shows the aver-
age wealth per agent for different fixed values of S(t) = S.
Since the total wealth of the agents and the market-
makers sum up to zero, a positive wealth of the agents
implies a negative wealth of the market-makers, and vice
versa. We can see that the wealth of the agents decreases
with the spread. When the spread is sufficiently large,
the wealth of the agents become negative at the end of
the monitoring period, implying that the market-makers
are getting profit. However, in the framework of fixed
transaction costs, there is only one optimal transaction
cost which yield a zero rate of wealth gain of the agents
asymptotically (such as that around 0.4 in Fig. 10(a)),
and it is difficult for the market to know this optimal
cost a priori. Even for this optimal cost, the approach to
the asymptotic is too slow. Consequently, a fixed bid-ask
spread cannot ensure a stable balance of wealth between
the agents and the market-makers.
2) Fixed transaction rate - For the market-makers to
maintain a profit in the long run, we consider a fixed
transaction rate R given by S(t) = R|PT|. As shown in
Fig. 10(b), the rate of change of the average wealth of the
agents decreases with time. This is due to the increasing
magnitude of the price with time, so that the spread col-
lected by the market-makers increases with time. Hence,
for sufficiently high transaction rate (such as 0.3% in
Fig. 10(b)), the market-makers gain profit at the end
of the monitoring period shown in Fig. 10(b). Even for
a modest transaction rate (such as 0.1% in Fig. 10(b)),
it is anticipated that the agents will eventually lose to
the market-makers. For a low transaction rate (such as
0.05% in Fig. 10(b)), we are not certain whether the aver-
age wealth of the agents will continue to increase, eventu-
ally saturate, or finally decrease beyond the monitoring
period. In any case, the time it takes to reach a steady
balance of wealth between the agents and the market-
makers, if it exists at all, is apparently prohibitively long.
3) Adaptive transaction rate - Since the above two
methods cannot ensure a stable balance of wealth be-
tween the agents and the market-makers, we introduce an
adaptive transaction rate as follows. For a bid-ask spread
given by S(t) = R(t)|PT(t)|, suppose the market-makers
decide the transaction rate R(t) so as to attain a total
target wealth of Wtarget(t) at time t. Since their total
wealth at time t is −
∑
i wi(t), they would increase (de-
crease)R(t) ifWtarget(t) is greater (less) than −
∑
i wi(t).
Hence, we propose an adaptive transaction rate updated
according to
R(t+ 1) = max
{
R(t) +
η
N
[
Wtarget +
∑
i
wi(t)
]
, 0
}
,
(11)
where η is the learning rate, dependent on how soon the
market-makers would like to reach their target wealth.
Here, we consider the case that the target wealth ap-
proaches zero. This is the scenario in which there is a
fierce competition among the market-makers. Results in
Fig. 10(c) show that the average wealth of the agents
(and hence that of the market-makers) converges to a
steady value after the transients die out, the duration of
the transient period decreasing with the learning rate.
Figure 11 shows the sample-averaged transaction rate,
indicating that it is necessary to impose a high transac-
tion rate in the transient period, before R(t) approaches
a universal trend effectively independent of the learning
rate. This confirms the previous result that it is not pos-
sible to maintain a stable balance of wealth between the
agents and the market-makers using a fixed transaction
rate.
V. NEW PLAYERS IN AN EVOLVING
MARKET
So far, we have found the existence of positive-sumness
in the space of price sensitivity and market impact, and
that an adaptive transaction rate can ensure a stable
balance of wealth between the agents and the market-
makers. However, the model is still a zero-sum game,
and one cannot keep both the agents and the market-
makers happy at the same time. To ensure participation
incentives of both groups, we consider in this section open
markets, in which underperforming agents leave the mar-
ket. They are replaced by new players who bring their
wealth into the market. Hence, for every replacment of
an agent, the average growth of wealth of the entire mar-
ket is equal to the difference between the average initial
wealth of a new player, minus the average final wealth of
an exiting agent.
One worry concerning the issue of participation incen-
tives is that when the new players enter the market, the
old players have already adapted their strategies to trade
in the market, and the new players have disadvantages in
their effort to profit from the market. If the new players
merely play the role of supplying wealth to the market,
without themselves any hope to profit from their partic-
ipation, then the new players will not have incentives to
participate in the long run.
Here, we consider the following model of an evolving
market. At t = 0, N agents start their trading activities
with their initial wealth set to zero. At every Tev time
steps, the agent with the least wealth leave the market.
She is replaced by a new agent with zero initial wealth
and a new set of randomly chosen strategies.
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FIG. 10: The time dependence of the average wealth of the agents for m = 3, s = 2, γ = 0.5, β = 0.5, K = 1, N = 100 and
1000 samples for (a) fixed bid-ask spread at the indicated values of S, (b) fixed transaction rate at the indicated values of R,
(c) adaptive transaction rate at the indicated values of η.
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FIG. 11: The time dependence of the sample-averaged trans-
actin rate for η = 10−7, 10−6, 10−5, 10−4. Parameters are the
sam as those in Fig.10
To consider the extent to which the survival proba-
bility of the new players is enhanced, we monitor the
survival probability at time T of the agents entering the
market at time t, and compare it with the survival prob-
ability of random evolution, which is given by pran(0) =
(1 − 1/N)T/Tev and pran(t) = (1 − 1/N)
(T−t)/Tev/N for
t > 0. In Fig. 12(a), we observe that the agents entering
the market at an early stage of the game have a higher
survival probability than random evolution. However,
for fast evolution (low values of Tev, the most recently
entering agents have a much lower survival probability
than random evolution. Furthermore, Fig. 13 shows that
the survival probability of the old players is higher than
that of random evolution for low values of Tev. This
shows that the enhanced survival probability of the early
agents is not the consequence of gaining wealth from the
old players, but rather taking advantage of the lately en-
tering agents. This implies that the late corners will have
little incentives to participate in a fast evolving market.
On the other hand, for a slowly evolving market as
shown in Fig. 12(b), we see that the survival probability
of the new agents is higher than that of random evolution
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FIG. 12: The survival probability at time T = 10000 of
new players entering the market at time t for m = 3, s = 2,
K = 3, γ = 0.5, β = 0.5, Wtarget(t) = 0, η = 10
−5, N = 100,
and 1000 samples, Tev = (a) 10, (b) 1000. Dotted line: The
corresponding survival probability for random evolution
for most of the entering time of the new agents. This
shows that the new agents have learned to play as well
as, or even better than, the old players.
Figure 13 shows the survival probability of the old
players as a function Tev. The survival probability is
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FIG. 13: Solid line: survival probability at time T = 10000
of the old players as a function of evolution time Tev. Dot-
ted line: The corresponding survival probability for random
evolution. Parameters are the same as those in Fig. 12.
higher than that of random evolution for low values of
Tev, but is roughly the same for high values of Tev. This
again shows that slow evolution provides a fairer envi-
ronment for the survival of the new players.
We have also tested the case that the new agents enter
the market with initial wealth equal to the average wealth
of the agents at the moment of entry. This places the new
agents on a much more equal footing with the old players.
Consequently, the survival probability of the new agents
becomes effectively the same as that for random evolu-
tion, even at the parameters of Fig. 12(a). This provides
another support to the assertion that it is possible for
the new agents to have participation incentives.
VI. TESTING WITH HANG SENG INDEX
To test whether the wealth-based payoff scheme intro-
duced by us is applicable to real market data, we re-
place the self-generated price in the model by real Hang
Seng Index (HSI) data. For convenience, we call this
wealth-based payoff scheme the Wealth Game. All the
transaction price and history of price change for strategy
prediction are made with respect to the real data. The
data series spans 5045 trading days, from 2 January 1987
to 17 May 2007.
A. Tests with Fixed Maxmium Position
We first consider the case that agents start with zero
wealth and have fixed maximum positions K. During
this period, the agent trades in the market a fictitious
stock whose unit price equals the Hang Seng Index. She
makes her buy, sell and hold decisions using the strate-
gies she holds, updating the wealth-based payoffs of her
Wealth change of strategy σ
after transactions at time t
Wealth Game kσ(t− 1)[PT(t)− PT(t− 1)]
=
P
t−1
t′
aσ(t
′)[PT(t)− PT(t− 1)]
Minority Game −aσ(t)[P (t+ 1) − P (t)]
$-Game aσ(t− 1)[P (t+ 1)− P (t)]
Majority Game aσ(t)[P (t+ 1) − P (t)]
TABLE I: The payoff change of strategy σ after transactions
at time t for the Wealth Game, the Minority Game, the $-
Game and the Majority Game. Here aσ(t) is the decision
made by strategy σ at time t.
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FIG. 14: The final wealth distribution for agents in the
Wealth Game, the Minority Game, the $-Game, and the Ma-
jority Game, in multiples of the HSI closing price of 17 May
2007. Parameters: m = 2, s = 2, K = 3, β = 0.5, 10000
agents for each payoff scheme.
strategies. For comparison, we also consider the update
of payoffs using the Minority Game, the $-Game, and the
Majority Game. The payoffs in these other schemes are
calculated with the excess demand being replaced by the
price change P (t+1)−P (t). A summary for the schemes
is given in Table I.
Figure 14 shows the wealth distribution of the four pay-
off schemes at the end of the trading period. The wealth
distribution for the Wealth Game is distinct from the
other schemes in that it has a prominent peak strongly
biased towards the direction of high wealth. In contrast,
the Minority Game has a broad peak biased towards the
direction of low wealth. The average wealth of the payoff
schemes are summarized in Table II. This shows that
the Wealth Game produces agents with the best average
performance.
On the other hand, Table II also shows that the wealth
of the richest agent produced by the Wealth Game is less
than those of the other payoff schemes, and much less
than that of the Minority Game, in particular. This indi-
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Payoff schemes Wealth Minority $-Game Majority
Game Game Game
Average wealth 0.6 -0.12 0.03 0.08
Best wealth 3.31 4.51 3.35 3.38
TABLE II: The average wealth and the wealth of the richest
agent in the Wealth Game, the Minority Game, the $-Game
and the Majority Game, in multiples of the HSI closing price
of 17 May 2007.
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FIG. 15: (Color online) The HSI and the wealth of the three
best players, five typical players, and the worst player in the
Wealth Game, all in multiples of the corresponding values
on 2 January 1987. Parameters: m = 3, s = 2, β = 0.5,
N = 10000.
cates that while the Wealth Game produces good agents
on average, it does not encourage the exploration of risky
strategies. On the other hand, the minority-seeking na-
ture of the Minority Game enables the agents to explore
unconventional strategies giving rise to unusual success,
but this is achieved through sacrificing the performance
averaged over the rest of the agents.
B. Tests with Wealth-Based Maximum Position
To make the model even more realistic, we consider the
case in which the agents have different maximum allowed
positions Ki(t) which evolve with time in accordance to
their wealth and the current price, such that Ki(t) equals
the integer part of max[wi(t)/P (t), 0]. The wealth of ev-
ery agent is initialized with the same amount of cash
wealth wi(0) = 5P (0) to encourage their initial partici-
pation in the trading of HSI, that is, their allowed max-
imum positions are Ki(0) = 5 initially. Compared with
the previous case of fixed maximum position, one new
feature in this test is that as time goes on, the wealth of
some agents decreases below the current price and they
are not able to open a new position.
Figure 15 shows the HSI, the wealth of the three best
players, five typical players, and the worst player among
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FIG. 16: The distribution of wealth, in multiples of the HSI
closing price of 17 May 2007, among the 10000 players in
the Wealth Game with m = 3, s = 2, β = 0.5. Inset: The
distribution of negative wealth, in multiples of the HSI closing
price of 17 May 2007, among the 10000 players in the Wealth
Game, the Minority Game, the $-Game, and the Majority
Game, with m = 3, s = 2, β = 0.5. The restriction of having
at least one buy and one sell decision per strategy is relaxed.
10000 players, rescaled by their respective initial values.
We make the following observations. (1) It is possible
to have agents whose wealth grows faster than the price
inflation of HSI. (2) Before the East Asian financial crisis
in 1997, the best three players adapt to the booming
environment by holding large numbers of stocks (positive
positions), capitalizing on the rising trend of the price.
However, they are not prepared for the crash. Thus,
they all suffer a great loss in the crash as they are still
holding high long positions immediately before the crash.
(3) For the typical players, many of them are already
lagging behind the price inflation, and thus are not rich
enough to hold large numbers of stocks. As a result,
they suffer less than the best players from the crash. (4)
Some players have their wealth eventually falling below
the price. This limits them from opening new positions.
Their wealth becomes frozen.
Figure 16 shows the distribution of final wealth of the
agents after trading over 20 years of HSI in this experi-
ment. About 10% of the agents are gaining agents, that
is, with their wealth growing faster than the price infla-
tion of HSI, as indicated by the tail of the distribution
to the right of the vertical line in Fig. 16. The wealth of
other agents grows slower than the HSI. Peaks near in-
teger values are observed, corresponding to agents whose
wealth are clustered around their maximum allowed po-
sitions.
The Wealth Game is compared with other conventional
payoff schemes. A control experiment is also done by
agents randomly making decisions. Table III shows that
among the four payoff schemes, the Wealth Game has
the best average performance, as evident from the av-
erage wealth and the fraction of gaining agents. As a
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Payoff schemes Wealth Minority $-Game Majority
Game Game Game
Average wealth 1.85 1.47 1.40 1.31
% gaining agents 10.4 8.68 6.40 5.45
Worst wealth 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12
% bankruptcy 0 0 0 0
Best wealth 11.16 17.15 11.13 10.88
TABLE III: The performance of the agents in the Wealth
Game, the Minority Game, the $-Game and the Majority
Game, in multiples of the HSI closing price of 17 May 2007.
benchmark, there are 0.03% of gaining agents in the case
of random choices.
Another advantage of the Wealth Game can be seen
by relaxing the constraint that the strategies held by the
agents must have at least one buy and one sell decision.
This constraint prevents an agent from getting trapped
in a long (short) position in a bearish (bullish) market,
and hence greatly reduces bankruptcy, that is, negative
wealth, as illustrated in Table III by the worst wealth
being positive and the bankruptcy rate being 0.
However, removing this constraint significantly in-
creases the bankruptcy rate. This is especially signif-
icant for the Minority Game, where the bankruptcy
rate is highest among the four payoff schemes, and the
poorest agents have largely negative wealth, as shown
in the inset of Fig 16. On the other hand, the same
figure shows that the bankruptcy rate for the Wealth
Game is much lower, and the poorest agents only have
a marginally negative wealth. Indeed, the bankruptcy
rates are 0.7%, 4.7%, 2.6%, and 3.0% for the Wealth, Mi-
nority, $-, and Majority Games respectively. This advan-
tage of the significantly reduced bankruptcy rate is prob-
ably due to the faithfulness of the Wealth Game payoff
in reflecting the wealth of an agent.
On the other hand, the Minority Game is able to pro-
duce a small number of agents with best performances,
as shown in Table III. This indicates that the Minor-
ity Game rewards more risky strategies that can result
in a small number of successful strategies, a conclusion
consistent with the results in the case of fixed maximum
position.
At first sight, it does not appear surprising that the
agents in the Wealth Game perform better than other
players, since their wealth is updated with the rule of
this model. However, the following two tests provide fur-
ther insights about the behaviors of the different payoff
schemes.
First, we test the payoff schemes on the HSI data for a
trendy period. We consider the period of recovery from
SARS, starting from the bottom on Apirl 25, 2003 to May
17, 2007. The price trend is rather monotonic, making it
easy for strategies to adopt. In this case, the Wealth
Game has the best average wealth, and the Minority
Game the worst.
Next, we consider a rugged period from July 15, 1996
to March 21, 2001 (one year before and after the peaks
at July 15, 1997 and March 21, 2000 respectively), cover-
ing both the East Asian financial crisis and the dot-com
bubble. During this period, the general trend of the HSI
consists of two rises and two falls, making it rather dif-
ficult for the strategies to adopt. In this case, the Mi-
nority Game performs much better than the other payoff
schemes, and the Wealth Game has the poorest average
wealth.
In summary, the Wealth Game performs better than
the Minority Game in trendy periods of HSI, but worse
in rugged periods. This is probably due to the use of
positions kξ(t+1) rather than the action aξ(t) in the cal-
culation of the payoff of strategy ξ. This gives a stronger
history dependence of the Wealth Game, which favors its
perfomance in trendy markets. However, this is probably
the same reason that makes it face more difficulties in pe-
riods with many trend reversals. Overall, in a time scale
as long as 20 years, the price time series of most financial
markets have rising trends such as the one in HSI, so that
payoff schemes with strong history dependence still have
overall advantages.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have considered a family of models of the financial
market in which all parties involved, namely, the agents,
the market-makers, and the new players, find incentives
to participate. This represents a departure from the
conventional Minority Games, whose focus does not re-
flect the positive-sumness of financial markets. The pre-
requisite of this departure is the direct usage of wealth as
both the payoff for evaluating strategies and a measure
of the success of individual agents, the latter allowing for
the possibility of positive-sumness of the market.
The wealth-based payoff scheme is successful in repro-
ducing collective behaviors of the agents resembling those
in real markets. Specifically, the price sensitivity γ and
the market impact β are introduced to fine tune, respec-
tively, the transduction from the excess demand to the
price dynamics, and the reaction of collective decisions
on individuals. In the phase space of γ and β, several be-
haviors resembling those in real financial markets emerge.
In the arbitrageurs’ attractor, alternate buy and sell cy-
cles emerge when the market impact is low, analogous
to the arbitraging activities of privileged traders in real
financial markets.
In the trendsetters’ attractor, quasiperiodic cycles of
price rises and falls are created by the trendsetters and
followed by the fickle agents. This coordinated behavior
has a direct correspondence to the roles played by the dif-
ferent kinds of agents in the real market. It demonstrates
the importance of using virtual wealth to measure the
success of strategies. Since the virtual wealth depends
on the history of decisions, it embeds a longer memory
in strategy selection, thus inducing a greater sophistica-
tion in the collective behavior such as that exhibited in
the trendsetters’ attractor.
16
The phases of the arbitrageurs’ and trendsetters’ at-
tractors are bounded by phase transition lines typical of
statistical physics. Their quasiperiodicity demonstrates
the robustness of the players’ coordinated behavior. On
the other hand, while they reproduce agent behaviors
plausible in real markets, it seems that their rigid peri-
odicities cannot be reproduced in real markets. It will
be interesting to study whether dynamical behaviors of
the same nature can be generated by models with more
heterogeneity, say, in the memory sizes and maximum
positions of the agents.
The phase diagram also consists of the irregular phase,
in which the time series of the price consists of intermit-
tent quasiperiodic states connected by abrupt changes.
Simple or linear price trends are not observed, making the
system dynamically interesting. Fluctuations in the long
time scales embody fluctuations in shorter time scales.
This is the regime with price time series resembling real
markets most.
The phase diagram is rather robust to variations of
the model. For example, in the grand-canonical version
in which agents with poor strategies are allowed to refrain
from playing, we found that the trendsetters’ attractor
is still sustained by the presence of fickle agents. We
have checked that the behavior of the other phases are
qualitatively the same in the grand-canonical game.
An interesting question is what parameter range of γ
and β should correspond to the real market. The at-
traction of agent-based models is its ability to relate ad-
justable microscopic mechanism with macroscopic mar-
ket behavior, thereby giving rise to self-organizing mech-
anisms for market evolution. Self-organization of markets
have been proposed for their states of criticality [7] and
efficiency [6]. Here, we propose a possible mechanism for
the market to self-organize to the irregular phase resem-
bling the real market.
Suppose the market is in the trendsetters’ phase with
a low value of γ. Since the market is positively summed
in this phase, the agents are encouraged to act boldly in
bidding and asking to maximize their expected wealth
gain. This leads to an increase in the price sensitivity.
The trend will continue until the market behavior enters
the irregular phase. Near the line of zero sum in the
irregular phase, the reduced wealth gain of the agents
discourages them from increasing their boldness in their
bids and asks, and the value of γ reaches a steady value.
The mechanism is similar to the self-organization of the
investment level to an efficient state in [6].
The self-organization of the market impact β might be
related to the activities of the arbitrageurs. Suppose the
market is in the arbitrageurs’ phase with a low value of
β. The profitable arbitraging opportunities attract more
arbitrageurs to enter the market. Consequently, each in-
dividual arbitrageur is no longer as privileged as before,
since their decisions will exert market impact on each
other. This results in an increase in the market impact
parameter. The trend wil continue until the market be-
havior enters the irregular phase. In practice, individual
agents experience different market impact due to their
different reaction times and transaction volumes. Models
with individualized market impact should be studied in
the future to further clarify this issue of self-organization.
Returning to the issue of participation incentives, the
phase space has a large region of positive-sumness. This
positive-sumness provides incentives for the agents to
play in the market. In the absence of new players joining
the market, their wealth comes from the market-makers
who play the role of balancing the supply and demand of
the market.
The participation incentives of the market-makers
come from the bid-ask spread during their transactions
with the players. We found that both the fixed transac-
tion cost and fixed transaction rate cannot ensure a stable
balance of wealth between the agents and the market-
makers. Rather, an adaptive transaction rate avoids this
problem.
The picture of paticipation incentives is completed
by considering open markets, in which underperforming
agents are replaced by new agents. This converts the
zero-sum game of the agents and market-makers to one
with positive sum. The participation incentive of the new
players may arise from their chances to learn the strate-
gies of the more successful players. We found that these
agents have survival probabilities matching those of ran-
dom evolution, provided that the evolution is sufficiently
slow.
Finally, we have tested the wealth-based payoff scheme
by playing the Wealth Game on HSI data over 20 years,
and compared its performance with the Minority Game,
the $-Game, and the Majority Game. We found that the
Wealth Game produces agents with much better average
performance than other games, and significantly reduces
the bankruptcy rate for agents holding poor strategies.
This is probably due to the faithfulness of the payoff
scheme in reflecting the wealth associated with a strategy.
Further tests on other markets are needed to experiment
the applicability of wealth-based payoff schemes and will
be reported elsewhere.
On the other hand, the Minority Game is able to pro-
duce a small number of extremely rich agents, whose
wealth is better than the richest agents produced by other
payoff schemes. This indicates that while the Wealth
Game produces good agents on average, it does not re-
ward the exploration of risky strategies, whereas the
minority-seeking nature of the Minority Game enables
the agents to explore unconventional strategies giving rise
to unusual success, but this is achieved through sacrific-
ing the performance averaged over the rest of the agents.
The strengths and weaknesses of the different payoff
schemes are also revealed in their performances in trendy
and rugged periods. The Wealth Game performs well
when history can provide a guide, but meets difficulties
in markets with many trend reversals.
These performance characteristics of the wealth-based
payoff scheme can be traced to the different ways virtual
scores are updated in the payoff schemes. Among the
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many differences between the Wealth Game and the Mi-
nority Game, the most essential one is that the position
kσ(t − 1) replaces the action aσ(t) in the calculation of
the virtual score in Table I. In the Wealth Game, agents
assess their gains by their positions rather than one-step
decisions. Since the position of a series of actions of a
strategy is equal to its historical sum, position-dependent
assessment schemes embed a longer memory scale in the
decision making process of agents than those in the Mi-
nority Game.
Interesting issues arising from this comparative study
remain. First, wealth-based payoff schemes are able to
explain the behavior of good investors statistically, but
since the extremely successful investors are produced by
the Minority Game rather than the Wealth Game, it is
possible that the behavior of the group of rich agents and
the few extremely rich agents have to be modeled dif-
ferently, especially with respect to the readiness to take
risks. Second, it would be interesting to formulate inte-
grated payoff schemes, so that the agents can both learn
from history during trendy periods, and be ready to ex-
plore risky but potentially successful strategies during
risky periods.
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